Dealing with the Fallout: West Germany's Response to the Solange Decision (1974). ACES Working Papers, 2011 by Davies, Dr. Bill
ACES Working Paper 2011: 
Dealing with the Fallout: 
West Germany's Response to the Solange Decision (1974) 
Dr. Bill Davies 
Dept. of Justice, Law & Society 
American University 
davies@american.edu 
202-885-2319 
*This paper is in 'working paper' status and should be cited only after consultation with the author* 
Abstract 
The European Union's powerful legal system has proven to be the vanguard moment in 
the process of European integration. As early as the 1960s, the European Court of Justice 
established an effective and powerful supranational legal order, beyond the original 
wording of the Treaties of Rome through the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy. 
Whereas scholars have analyzed the evolution of EU case law and its implications, only 
very recent historical scholarship has examined how the Member States received this 
process in the context of a number of difficult political and economic crises for the 
integration process. This paper investigates how the national level dealt with these 
fundamental transformations in the European legal system. Specifically, it examines one 
of the Union's most important member states, the Federal Republic of Germany. Faced 
with a huge number of cases dealing with European law, German judges dealt with the 
supremacy of European law very cautiously, negotiating between increasingly polarized 
academic, public and ministerial debates on the question throughout the 1960s. By the 
mid 1970s, the German Constitutional Court famously limited the power of the ECJ in its 
So/ange decision (1974). This was an expression of a broader discourse in Germany from 
1968 onwards about the qualitative nature of democracy and participation in public life 
and was in some aspects a marker, at which the German elites felt comfortable expressing 
the value of their national constitutional system on the European stage. This paper 
examines the political, media and academic build up and response to the Constitutional 
Court's decision in the 1970s, arguing that the national "reception" is central to 
understanding the dynamics and evolution of European Union legal history. 
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The growth in influence of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) following its attempt to establish 
the direct effectiveness and supremacy of European Law in the mid 1960s is now a well-known 
and increasingly central part of the integration narrative. It has not always been the case that 
Law has been so central to European integration histories. Most analyses placed weight almost 
exclusively on the political1, economic2 or ideological3 elements of European integration. The 
legal dimension gained prominence since the revelatory works of legal scholars such as Eric 
Stein4, Hjalte Rasmussen5 and Joseph Weiler6 in the 1980s7• The question as to why the ECJ 
appeared so successful in driving a federalizing agenda in the legal realm despite the seemingly 
recalcitrant political atmosphere of the mid-1960s and since, has become recurrent in political 
and legal sciences ever since. Frequently, the models produced by these schools of thought have 
examined the expansion of the ECJ's power through the "constitutionalisation" paradigm -
namely that direct effect and supremacy represented a natural evolution from the Treaty of Rome 
and their articulation had saved the process of integration from its opponents. Frequently, such 
models- usually nowadays grouped under the heading "Integration through Law" (ITL)8 -made 
assertions about the strategic nature of the ECJ's choices9, or the influence of empowered sub-
national actors 10, or the willingness to accept less escape from legal obligations in exchange for 
greater voice in the formation of those laws 11 • 
1 Moravcsik, A. (1998). The Choice for Europe: Social Purnose and the State Power from Messina to Maastricht, 
London, UCL Press. 
2 Gillingham, J. (2003). European Integration. 1950-2003: Superstae or New Market Economy?, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
3 Lipgens, W. (1982). A History of European Integration: Vol. One: The Formation of the European Unity 
Movement 1945-50, Oxford: C1arendon Press. 
4 Stein, E. (1981). "Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution." American Journal of 
International Law 75(1 (1981)): 1-27. 
5 Rasmussen, H. (1986). On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice: A Comparative Studey in Judicial 
Policymaking, Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster: Martinus NijhoffPublishers. 
6 Weiler, J. (1999). The constitution of Europe: "do the new clothes have an emperor?" and other essays on 
European integration. Cambridge ;. New York, Cambridge University Press. 
7 Stein, E. (1964). "Toward Supremacy of Treaty- Constitution by Judicial Fiat: On the Margin of the Costa Case." 
Michigan Law Review 63(1964): 491-518. 
8 Cappelletti, M., M. Seccombe, et al. (1985). Integration through law : Europe and the American federal experience. 
Berlin ; New York, W. de Gruyter. 
9 Garrett, G. (1995). 11The Politics of Legal Integration in the European Union." International Organisation 49(1995): 
171-181.; Garrett, G., D. R. Keleman, et al. (1998). "The European Court of Justice, National Governments and 
Legal Integration in the European Union." International Organisation 52(1): 149-176.; Moravcsik, A. (1998). The 
Choice for Europe: Social Puroose and the State Power from Messina to Maastricht, London, UCL Press. 
10 Burley, A. and W. Mattli (1993). "Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration." 
International Organisation 47 0993): 41-76, Mattli, W. and A.-M. Slaughter (1995). "Law and Politics in the 
European Union: A Reply to Garret!." International Organisation 49(1 (Winter 1995)): 183-190, Mattli, W. and A.-
M. Slaughter (1998). "Revisiting the European Court of Justice." International Organisation 52(1 (Winter)): 177-
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Recently, not only has the concept of constitutionalisation come under question 12, but also the on 
going release of primary source materials from national archives has allowed historians to place 
the JTL theories under real empirical scrutiny13 • This especially holds true for studies of how the 
Member States 'received' the ECJ's decisions, both within the courtroom, but also crucially 
amongst the public, academia and within the government machinery itself. These "Reception 
Studies" reveal a more nuanced and complicated reality than can be easily incorporated into a 
generalizing model. This, of course, rests on the theoretical assumption that the Law and the 
Courtroom, both national and supranational, do not exist in vacuums, immune to broader public 
and intellectual opinion. Instead, it works on the presumption that judicial decision -making 
dialectically both mirrors and informs elements of wider social discourse and that legitimate 
judgment requires a delicate reconciliation of legal rationale with the reason of popular will. 14 
Diverse perceptions of national interest, varied institutional dynamics, as well as oscillating 
streams of public and academic opinion towards the ECJ and European integration led to a non-
linear acceptance of the ECJ's jurisprudence by national actors across time and across 
geography. If our understanding of a constitutionalized order rests of the presumption of a 
consistently applied, highest law of the land, then the historical approach to legal integration 
does much to undermine this. What exists instead is a patchwork, non-uniform reception in the 
Member States, resulting in conditional barriers erected by national courts and concessions won 
from the supranational institutions. 
209, Mattli, W. and A.-M. Slaughter (1 998). "The Role ofNational Courts in the Process of European Integration: 
According for Judicial Preferences and Constraints, in Slaughter, Anne-marie & Alec Stone Sweet & JHH Weiler 
(eds.), The European Courts and the National Courts- Doctrine and Jurisprudence: Legal Change in its Social 
Context.'" Oxford: Hart Publishing: 253-276. 
11 Weiler, J. (1999). The constitution of Europe: "do the new clothes have an emperor?" and other essays on 
European integration. Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press. 
12 Rasmussen, M. (2010). Constructing and Deconstruction European 'Constitutional' European Law. Some 
reflections on how to study the history of European law. Europe. The New Legal Realism. K. H.-S. Henning Koch, 
Ulrich Haltern and Joseph Weiler (eds.). Aarhus, DJ0F Publishing: 639-660.; Vauchez, A. (2010). "The 
transnational politics ofjudicialization. Van Gend en Loos and the making ofEU polity.'' European Law Journal 
16(1): 1-28. 
13 Davies, B. (2007). Constitutionalising the European Community: West Germany Between Legal Sovereignty and 
European Integration, 1949-1975. European Studies/German. London, King's College London. PhD., Davies, B. 
(2008). "Meek Acceptance? The West German Ministeries' Reaction to the Van Gend en Loos and Costa 
decisions." Journal of European Integration History 14(2): 20 .. See also forthcoming •Reception Studies' on France 
by Julie Bailleux (University of Pantheon Sorbonne), on the Netherlands by Jieskje Hollander (University of 
Groningen) and on the United Kingdom by the author of this paper. 
14 Kahn, P. W. (1999). The Cultural Study of Law: Reconstructing Legal Scholarship. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
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Nowhere is this more apparent than after the German Constitutional Court's (BVerfG) Solange 
decision of May 29, 1974, in which the court issued a long awaited and highly controversial 
judgment in a case that had bounced between the national and European court systems for a 
number of years. A main protagonist in this protracted courtroom drama was the Administrative 
Court of Frankfurt am Main (F AC), which, when asked to rule on the applicability of a European 
regulation by a German export firm, had first requested a preliminary ruling from the ECJ15 but 
then re-referred the case to the BVerfG a short while later16• While the BVerfG did not find a 
problem with the technical details in the case at hand, it did take the opportunity to articulate its 
opinion on the relationship between European law and the national constitutional order. It 
explained that it would accept submissions by its own national courts on the constitutionality of 
European legislation, as long as ("solange" in German) the (then) European Community lacked a 
fundamental rights provision, drawn up through a parliamentary mechanism, equivalent to that 
given in the West German Basic Law. This was a direct U-turn from the court's earlier decision 
in 1967, in which it ruled European legislation was separate from the national order and therefore 
inadmissible for adjudication by German public authorities17 • Instead, it more fairly reflected 
increasingly strident calls from amongst the West German legal academy and public media for 
checks on the ECJ's growing power, predominately through ensuring "greater structural 
congruence"18 between the European institutions and the Federal Republic. 
In essence, as the President of the BVerfD confirmed in subsequent wntmgs and media 
interviews19, the court deliberately aimed to place pressure on the ECJ and the supranational 
institutions to improve rights protection and parliamentary representation to a standard 
15 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft 11/70 [1970] ECR I 125 
16 BVerfGE 37,271 2 BvL 52/71 So/ange I 
17 BVerfG 'Constitutional Rights' decision of! 8th October 1967 [1968] Europarecht 134 -It is worth highlighting 
at this point that this decision was made by the First Senate of the BVerfG. The later Solange decision was made by 
the Second Senate. The implications of this will become apparent later as the Government attempts to deal with the 
political fallout to the case. 
18 Schlochauer, H. J. (1951). "Der Ubernationale Charakter der Europiiischen Gemeinschaft ftir Kohle und Stahl." 
Juristen-Zeitung(IO (1951)): 289-290, Schlochauer, H. J. (1955). "Rechtsformen der europaischen Ordnung." Archiv 
des V6lkerrechts(5 (1955/5)): 40-62, Schlochauer, H. J. (1963). "Das Verhaltnis des Rechts der Europiiischen 
Wirtschaftsgerneinschaft zu den nationalen Rechtsordnung der Mitgliedstaaten." Archiv des VOlkerrechts 11(1 
(1963)): 1-34. 
19 Benda, E. (1974). "Das ·spannungsverh:iltnis von Grundrechten und Ubernationalen Recht." Deutsches 
Verwaltungsblatt 10(11): 389-396 .. See also subsequent media interviews "Zur Frage der Schaffung eines 
europaischen Grundrechtskatalog", interview with Ernst Benda, Deutsche Welle, 09.04.1975 
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equivalent to that at the national level. This is clearly representative of the wishes expressed in 
broader West German social discourse documented below. It appears to be more than 
coincidental then that the Community moved to address these specific issues in the years 
immediately following the Solange decision. For instance, in 1977 the European Parliament, 
Council and the Commission issued a Joint Declaration concerning the protection of fundamental 
rights20, and in 1979, the ECJ promised to "draw inspiration from constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States"21 . Of course, 1979 also saw the long delayed implementation of 
direct elections to the European Parliament. As such, it might be argued that German intellectual 
and public opinion of the 1960s and 1970s, channeled through the resonant voice of the BVerfD, 
shaped the institutional constellation of European governance at the end of the 1970s and the 
implications those changes have had today. The perception of continued relative weakness of 
the European Parliament, despite the reform of 1979, evidently lies behind the BVerfG's more 
recent jurisprudence requesting (in Solange fashion) increased national parliamentary 
representation at the supranational level22• We might also consider German leadership23 in the 
advocacy and creation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights as a parallel to the BVerfG's 
decision-making, despite the court's rescinding of its 1974 decision in the subsequent Solange II 
case in 1986?4 Furthermore, the fact that a long list of German parliamentarians brought the 
Lisbon Treaty case to the court gives credence to the approach advocated in this paper oflooking 
beyond the courtroom to appreciate most accurately the dynamics of European legal integration. 
With this in mind, there is clear ancestral lineage between the recurring themes in broader social 
and intellectual debates of the 1960s and 1970s documented here and those since the Maastricht 
Treaty in contemporary Germany. 
This 'external' dimension to the Solange decision- its attempt to influence political and judicial 
forces outside of the FRG- is only one part of the story. There was equally as much resistance 
to the decision 'internal' to the state too. Indeed, the government itself, whilst under attack by 
the Commission, stood against the BVerfG in principle. As such, the government found itself in 
20 
"Joint Declaration by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission", in Official Journal of the 
European Communities (OJEC). 27.04.1977, No C 103, pp. I. 
21 Case 44/79 Hauer vs. Land Rhein land Pfalz [1979] European Court Report 321 
22 BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 vom 30.6.2009 
23 Castiglione, D., J. SchOnlau, et al. (2008). Constitutional politics in the EuroPean Union : the Convention moment 
and its aftermath. New York, Palgrave Macmillan. 
24 See BVerfG decision of22"' October 1986 'Solange 11' [1987] Common Market Law Review 225 
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between the proverbial rock and hard place. The 'internal' debates in academia, in the public 
sphere and in the various relevant government ministries· leading up to and after the BVerfG's 
Solange decision are the predominant focus of this paper. In one sense- the historian's sense-
documenting this discourse is important simply because this narrative does not exist elsewhere. 
However, these debates also matter to those interested in comprehending the full mechanics of 
European legal integration, particularly in light of the changes in European governance 
seemingly prompted by the Solange decision. Moreover, this narrative delivers fare for those 
hoping to understand the dynamics between the spheres of law, society, politics and public 
opinion. This is a complex relationship at the best of times. In this case, however, the 
complexity is multiplied by the fact the law under question is not strictly one's own. By crossing 
the disciplinary boundaries between History, Law and Political Science, recent scholarship has 
tried with some success to tie develops in European governance to long-term trends in the nature 
of administrative and representative governance25• 
To add yet another layer to this intricacy, it is important to remember the critical significance of 
European integration to the still very young Federal Republic (FRG) of the 1960s and 1970s. By 
pooling sovereignty over its war-making industries - and soon after its entire economy - the FRG 
used European integration to begin the process of reconciliation with its Western neighbours. In 
one way, the cause of integration replaced the need for an exclusive national identity in the 
divided and occupied country. More importantly, the FRG, as Europe's biggest export economy, 
is supportive of economic and political integration because the increased economic exchange that 
this furthered undoubtedly fuelled its prosperity and underlined its post-War identity of the 
'Wirtschaftswunder'26• At the same time, another crucial aspect of the FRG's self-definition was 
the rigor of its democratically orientated legal system. Centered on an inviolable adherence to a 
progressive set of basic rights enshrined in the new Basic Law, combined with a clear separation 
of powers and incorporation of checks and balances, the new national constitutional order, if 
25 Lindseth, P. L. (2010). Power and legitimacy: reconciling Europe and the nation-state. Oxford; New York, N.Y., 
Oxford University Press. 
26 Abelshauser, W. (2004). Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte seit 1945, Munich: C H Beck Verlag.; Nicholls, A. 
(1995). The Bonn Republic: West Germany Democracy 1945-1990, London: Longman.; Pulzer, P. (1995). German 
Politics 1945-1995, Oxford: Oxford University Press.; Gortemaker, M. (2005). Kleine Geschichte der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Munich: C H Beck Verlag.; Kettenacker, L. (1997). Germany since 1945, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
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deemed only temporary at the start27, sought to define and demarcate the essence of the FRG. 
The BVerfG, when asked to rule on European legal supremacy, found itself sucked dead center 
into a maelstrom of competing perceptions of the new post-war Germany. The two options the 
court faced - deny supremacy and protect national rights provisions, or accept supremacy and 
potentially undermine national constitutional integrity - were in their own way equally 
unpalatable and destined to raise debate and controversy. 
The West German legal academy had long struggled with the questions of the nature of 
European law and its relationship to the domestic order28 . The reception of the 
constitutionalisation process among West German legal academia was fraught by heated 
discussion, with the majority of legal experts unwilling, at first, to accept the legal autonomy -
the 'supranationality' - of law created by Community institutions29. Mainstream opinion up 
until the mid-1960s regarded the Community as an albeit complex and original international 
organization and accordingly its law effective as standard international law and therefore subject 
to final national judicial adjudication. A small group of scholars, closely aligned to, or members 
of, the governing elite worked as vocal advocates of the ECJ and the 'supranationality' of the 
new legal order30. Early discussions between the two sides of the debate centered on the ability 
of the national government to transfer legal sovereignty to the Community institutions through 
Article 24 of the constitution31 , with the pro-integrationists claiming the right for the Community 
to use the powers conferred to it fully. 
27 The Basic Law was meant to be a temporary document, governing the western half of Germany until unification 
could be achieved. See, amongst others, Hesselberger, D. (2001). Das Grundgesetz. Kommentar fur die politische 
Bildung, Bonn: Bundeszentrale fur Politische Bildung. 
28 See Davies, B. (2007). Constitutionalising the European Community: West Germany Between Legal Sovereignty 
and European Integration, 1949-1975. European Studies/Gennan. London, King's College London. PhD, Davies, B. 
(2008). "Meek Acceptance? The West German Ministeries' Reaction to the Van Gend en Loos and Costa 
decisions." Journal of European Integration History 14(2): 20. 
29 Compare this to the ECJ's reasoning in the Van Gend en Loos decision 
30 Included in this group political actors of some significance- none more so than Waiter Hall stein and Hans von 
der Groeben, but also other scholars such as Carl-Friedrich Ophiils, who was a lead delegate on West Germany's 
negotiating team drawing up the Treaty of Rome, or Karl Carstens, a top official at the Foreign Office throughout 
the period and later Federal President. 
31 See, for instance, Pigorsch, W. (1959). Die Einordnung vOlkerechtlicher Nonnen in das Recht der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland. Eine Studie ze den Artikeln 25. 59 und 79 des Grundgesetzes fUr die Bundesrepublik vom 23. Mai 
1949, Hamburg: Hansischer Gildenverlag. 
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By the start of the 1960s, a compromise position, heavily influenced by the work of Hans-JUrgen 
Schlochauer32, had been achieved by the two sides of the debate, in which it was accepted that a 
certain level of 'structural congruence' between the democratic institutions of the FRG and the 
EC would enable a legitimate transfer of sovereignty. After the introduction of the direct effect 
and supremacy doctrines, opinions on the two sides of the debates once again clashed. The pro-
integrationists, spurred on by the ECJ' s jurisprudence, began to establish a network of scholars to 
further their position. The creation of dedicated journals, such as Europarecht in 1964, and the 
holding of conferences, in particular, the Bensheim Colloquium33 in 1964, helped to consolidate 
the pro-integration position and promulgate the view amongst a growing number of mainstream 
scholars34• On the other side, some scholars began questioning the wisdom of transferring 
national competency to a set of institutions without the democratic or basic rights safeguards 
found in the national constitution35 • By the time the BVerfG's 'Constitutional Rights' ruling in 
1967 accepted the supremacy and effectiveness of EC law by default (see above), opinion had 
radicalized still further. 
At the turn of the 1970s, a number of important decisions emerged at the turn of the decade. In 
November 1969, during the Stauder vs. Ulm case36, the ECJ ruled against its earlier decisions of 
1959 and 196037, declaring that fundamental rights protection did actually form a general 
principle of Community law, even if a specific catalogue of rights did not yet exist. Following 
on from its de facto recognition ofthe supremacy of Community law in 1967, the BVerfG added 
32 Schlochauer, 1956, p 367. The argument about the necessity for a certain amount of structural congruency 
between national and supranationallevels has its origins in the works of Alfred VerdroB, an Austrian scholar, whose 
of.inion was influential in the West German Foreign Office 
3 See Davies, B. (2007). Constitutionalising the European Community: West Germany Between Legal Sovereignty 
and European Integration, 1949-1975. European Studies/Gennan. London, King's College London. PhD., chapter 2. 
For the growth of transnational judicial networks, with close ties to Brussels, see Alter, K. J. (2008). "Jurist 
Advocacy Movements in Europe and the Andes: How Lawyers Help Promote International Legal Integration." 
SSRN eLibrary. 
34 Evidence for this is the discernible shift in opinion in the influential German Public Teachers Association Meeting 
in Kiel, 1964. See Kaiser, J. H. (1964). Bewahrung und Veranderung demokratischer und rechtstaatlicher 
Verfassungsstruktur in den internationalen Gemeinschaften. Tagung der deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer Kiel, 
VerOffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer 
35 See, as a typical example of this position, the comments of the Wilhelm W.engler in Wengler, W. (1968). "Aus 
Wissenschaft und Praxis, Grundrechtsminimum und Equivalenz der Grundrechtsschutzsysteme." Juristen-Zeitung 
10:2 .. 
36 Case 29/69 Stauder vs. Ulm [1969] European Court Report 419 
37 Case 1/58 Stork vs. High Authority [1959] European Court Report 17, Case 36-38 and 40/59 
Ruhrkohlenverkaufsgesellschaften vs. High Authority [1960] European Court Report 423 
8IPage 
in the 1971 Liitticke decision the positive recognition of the doctrines of supremacy and direct 
effece8• As such, between the years 1967 to 1971, the BVerfG became the first court overall to 
fully recognize the supremacy and direct effectiveness of European law in relation to national 
law, not however explicitly with regard to constitutionallaw39• This question as the relationship 
between national constitutional law and the European legal system remained open and became a 
particularly controversial topic of discussion amongst legal-academia. The ECJ's preliminary 
ruling in the Internationale Handelsgesellscha.ft case40 brought things to head by declaring that 
in the name of the "uniformity and efficacy of Community law", fundamental rights of Member 
States may have to be sidelined in the face of conflicting European regulations. In other words, 
building on the Costa vs. ENEL case, European law now broke Member States' constitutional 
law. The most vocal critic of the ECJ in West German legal academia was the University of 
Mainz professor, Hans-Heinrich Rupp41 . His attacks on the EC's lack of basic rights provisions 
and democratic structure prompted an intense debate with the pro-integration scholars, most 
notably Hamburg's Hans-Peter Ipsen42. Such was the contention in this debate, that the effect of 
EC law on the national constitution became part of a parliamentary enquiry commission in 1972. 
The ECJ's statement again strongly divided opinion in West German academia. Supporting the 
ECJ, scholars such as Gert Meier, argued the ECJ was merely re-stating the autonomy of the EC 
legal order, which was increasingly accepted during the 1960s. Its separateness meant that it 
38 Firma Alfons Liitticke GmbH, Koln-Deutz, BVerfG [1972]1 EuR 51 
39 At this moment then, as Alter points out the BVerfG had gone further than any other national court in accepting 
the radical jurisprudence from the ECJ of the early 1960s - Alter, K. (2001). Establishing the Supremacy of 
European Law: The Making of an International Rule of Law in Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press .. Mann 
argues that the reason for the BVerfG's endorsement of the ECJ at this point was due to the political 'paralysis' of 
the EC during the mid-1960s, and that a rejection at this point would have been a .body blow for the integration 
project Mann, C. J. (1972). The Function of Judicial Decision in European Economic Integration, The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.. Weiler maintains a similar argument, seeing closer judicial integration during the 
1960s as the corollary to political disintegration within the European Council Weiler, J. (1999). The constitution of 
Europe: "do the new clothes have an emperor?" and other essays on European integration. Cambridge; New York, 
Cambridge University Press.). 
40 See note 15 above 
41 Rupp, H. H. (1970). "Die Grundrechte und das Europiiische Gemeinschaftsrecht." Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 
9(1970): 353-359, Rupp, H. H. (1974). Grundgesetz und "Wirtschaftsverfassung", TUbingen: JCB Mohr (Paul 
Siebeck). 
42 Ipsen, H. P. (1970). "Verfassungsperspektiven der Europaischen Gemeinschaften- Vortag gehalten vor der 
Berliner Juristischen Gesellschaft am 17 April 1970." Berlin: Waiter de Gruyter & Co, Ipsen, H. P. (1972). 
Europaisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, Tubingen: JCB Mohr (Paul Siebeck). 
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could not be bound to the conditions of national legal orders43 • On the other side, the specialist 
journal, AuBenwirtschaftsdienst des Betriebs-Beraters, published a critique of the ECJ's decision 
by the Hamburg based lawyer Helmut Rittstieg. In this, Rittsteig argued the ECJ's claim to 
incorporate that spirit of national constitutions was too "vague" and "questionable" to protect an 
individual's rights. He claimed basic rights remained a "secondary condition" for the ECJ 
behind that of the general effectiveness of the EC and that this judgment barely represented a 
successful pursuance of basic rights provisions at the EC level. 44 The FAC followed the 
argumentation offered by Rittstieg, promptly refusing to apply the ECJ' s ruling and again 
referred the case- this time to the BVerfG, resulting in the Solange I decision. In the following 
three years, 1971 to 1974, the debate around the applicability of EC law in West Germany 
reached its most intense phase. 
What stood out most about the FAC's reference however was the heavy influence of a speech 
given by Hans Heinrich Rupp 45, a legal professor from Mainz, from whose work the court 
quoted directly in its referral46• In a speech to the German Academy of Judges in January 
197047, Rupp launched a polemic attack, rebelling against the so-called "Kiel Wave" and against 
the growing acceptance amongst legal-academic opinion that the transfer of sovereignty through 
Article 24 (i) BL empowered an autonomous supranational legal entity to issue directly effective 
and supreme regulations within the national constitutional framework. While scholars, for 
example Wilhelm Wengler48, merely posed the question during the 1960s as to how 
competencies could be transferred to - in terms of a deficit in democratic legitimacy -
structurally incongruent institutions, Rupp now openly and strongly criticized this process. He 
declared that the ECJ had sidelined the Basic Law in its 1963-4 jurisprudence as a 'farce' and 
denied that the Community held any kind of institutional resemblance with the Federal Republic 
43 Meier, G. (1970). "Commentary to European Court of Justice Decision 29/69." Deutsches 
Verwaltungsblatt(l970): 614-615. 
44 Rittstieg, H. (1971). "Commentary to European Court of Justice Decision 11/70." Aussenwirtschaftsdienst des 
Betriebs-Beraters 4(1971): 183-185. 
45 Hans Heinrich Rupp (1926) is a Professor of Public Law at the University of Mainz, having also worked at 
Ttibingen (1963-4), Marburg (1964-1968). 
46 Alter, K. (2001). Establishing the Sunremacy of European Law: The Making of an International Rule of Law in 
Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
47 Rupp, H. H. (1970). "Die Grundrechte und das Europiiische Gemeinschaftsrecht." Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 
9(1970): 353-359. 
48 Wengler, W. (1968). 11Aus Wissenschaft und Praxis, Grundrechtsminimum und Equivalenz der 
Grundrechtsschutzsysteme." Juristen-Zeitung 10: 2. 
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at all. In this, Rupp rejected obviously not only the line taken by supranationalist scholars, such 
as Ophiils, von der Groeben, Grewe , but also directly attacked 1psen. Rupp continued in the 
speech to vent angrily against the Community, describing it as a regime lacking democratic rule 
and a regime without fundamental rights arguing against the pragmatic 'structural congruence' 
compromise of the 1960s. 
Most importantly for the debate, Rupp rejected the direct effect and supremacy of Community 
Law, particularly over and above the fundamental rights of the Basic Law. He went against the 
BVerfG's 1967 decision, which stated that the BVerfG had no competence to judge Community 
Law, arguing that if the Community norm is adopted into West German law, then the final 
arbiter on its applicability must be the national judiciary- in this case the BVerfG. Specifically, 
Rupp advocated the verification of European regulations by the BVerfG against national 
fundamental rights as an important step in the legitimization of the Community. It was not 
enough, he contended, for scholars such as Ipsen to argue that conflicts with the Basic Law 
would not arise because of the technical nature of the Community. The Europe such a policy 
would create would be unified, but only under a bureaucratic technocracy. Only a Europe built 
and judged on the democratic, legitimate ideals of its constituent parts would be acceptable to 
future generations. 
With Rupp clearly drawing the battle lines on this issue, it was the turn of the focus of his 
criticism, Hans Peter 1psen, to respond to the charges. Three months later, in a speech held in 
Berlin, 1psen accused Rupp of not fully understanding the nature of the integration process - for 
1psen, it remained a merely technical, economic procedure and therefore basic rights need not be 
touched upon49• Rupp was accused of a having a late nineteenth century comprehension of 
constitutional law, whereas lpsen prided himself on a more progressive, internationalized 
understanding. 1psen pulled no punches in his attack on Rupp, asking why other more 
experienced democracies such as Belgium and Holland would be as "suicidal" as to agree to the 
supremacy of EC law. He challenged Rupp to name an area of EC competence that would 
seriously affect the provision of national fundamental rights, and if one were found, he would 
49 lpsen, H. P. (1970). "Verfassungsperspektiven der Europaischen Gemeinschaften - Vortag gehalten vor der 
Berliner Juristischen Gesellschaft am 17 April 1970." Berlin: Waiter de Gruyter & Co. 
111 Page 
provide the EC provision that provides an equal guarantee in this area. In the end, Ipsen 
highlighted how the Stauder vs. Ulm decision of 1969 demonstrated the ECJ' s commitment to 
fundamental rights and how these were, at national and EC levels, indistinguishable. Ipsen went 
on then in 1972 to publish an extensive survey of EC Law comprising over fifteen hundred 
pages, with its implications for the Federal Republic50• In this, he crystallized his view that 
fundamental rights are guaranteed in the EC through its inability to affect them in any 
meaningful way. Calling Rupp a dogmatist, Ipsen conclusively rejected the need for national 
judicial control over EC law. 
Perhaps fearing an unwelcome outcome to the BVerfG's ruling in the re-referred case, the ECJ 
guaranteed in the Nold vs. Commission case 51, delivered two weeks before the Solange decision 
to uphold the provision of national fundamental rights in its jurisprudence by judging invalid any 
regulations incompatible with national constitutions. In a sense, the ECJ sought to pre-empt the 
BVerfG by declaring national constitutional rights safe and protected by EC law. However, this 
did not change the BVerfG's decision. The criticism against its 1967 decision from Rupp and 
others had greatly alarmed the BVerfG and it sought to redress the imbalance it had created from 
its 1967 ruling in its decision of May 197452• In particular, the BVertG adhered closely to the 
terminology of the ongoing academic debates and renounced a form of 'structural congruence' 
between the Federal Republic and the Community. It stated that it withheld the right to judge the 
applicability of a Community norm against the basic rights, as long a) the Community lacked a 
comparable catalogue of rights of its own. In one short decision, the BVerfG had shifted 
dramatically to favour the side of the legal-academic spectrum that it had angered with its 1967 
decision. As a result, it now faced the wrath of those scholars, with whom it had previously 
sided. 
Ipsen was of course quick to react to the decision, describing it as "wrong ... deceptive, 
superficial and legally erroneous"53 • He accused the BVerfG ofshortsightedness and that it was 
50 Ipsen, H. P. (1972). Europaisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, Tubingen: JCB Mohr (Paul Siebeck). 
51 Case 4/73 [1974] Nold vs. Commission, European Court Report, 491-507 
52 Intemationale Handelsgesellschaft vs. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fi.ir Getreide und Futtermittel 'Solange I', 37 
BVerfG 271 [1974] 
53 lpsen, H. P. (1975). "BVerfG versus EuGH re "Grundrechte", Zum BeschuB des Zweiten Senats des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts vom 29 Mai 1974 (BVe1fGE Bd, 37 S, 271)." Europarecht 14(3 (1979)): 223-238. 
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crucial to keep in mind that the stage of the Community criticized by the BVerfG was in fact 
transitory, and therefore might well lack some basic rights protection. The final stage of the 
Community would however not be helped by the retention of Member State control over its 
constitutional development. The fact that the BVerfG retained the power to decide if a 
regulation was 'inapplicable' in West Germany, but not 'invalid' was described by Ipsen as 
'ironic'. He questioned the difference between the two terms, seeing this as a deliberate means 
to confuse what was really being stated by the BVerfG - that it now sought to control the 
integration process. Reinhard Riegel, who had earlier argued for the exclusive competency of 
the ECJ to rule on EC law, sided strongly with Ipsen on two accounts 54• Firstly, he argued with 
Ipsen, that it was for the Community, in dialogue with the Member States, to set its own 
standards of basic rights protection Secondly, he criticized the BVerfG for demanding a 
codification of basic rights protection that was neither needed nor in the remit of the BVerfG to 
demand. He believed the Federal Republic lay open to the charge of not fulfilling its duty to 
implement Community regulations. Meinhard Hilf and Eckhart Klein argued separately that the 
BVerfG had merely opened a "Pandora's Box", with an argumentation that was bound to 
"infect" other national courts55 and have "fatal" consequences for the EC legal system56. Hilf 
argued that the Federal Republic now be liable for charges for failing to fulfill its Treaty 
obligations, although the government itself opposed the BVerfG's decision 57• Gert Meier, while 
recognizing the deficit in basic rights protection in the Community, condemned the Solange I 
decision because it went against the principle of autonomy of the EC's legal system established 
in the 1960s58 • 
54 Riegel, R. (1974 (a)). "BundesverfassungsgerichtsbeschluB Anmerkung." Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 
48(1974): 2176-2177, Riegel, R. (1974 (b)). "Zum Problem der al!gemeinem Rechtsgrundsatze und Grundrechte im 
Gemeinschaftsrecht." Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 36(1974): 1585-1590. 
55 Hilf, M. (1975). "Sekundares Gemeinschaftsrecht und deutsche Grundrechte. Zum Beschluss des 
Bundesverfassungsgericht vom 29. Mai 1974." Zeitschrift ftir aus!Andisches offentliches Recht und 
Volkerrecht(1975): 51-66. 
56 Klein, E. (1975). "Stellungnahme aus der Sicht des deutschen Verfassungsrechts." Zeitschrift fur auslandisches 
offentliches Recht un Volkerrecht(1975): 67-78. 
57 Hilt; M. (1975). "Sekundares Gemeinschaftsrecht und deutsche Grundrechte. Zum Beschluss des 
Bundesverfassungsgericht vom 29. Mai 1974." Zeitschrift flir ausHindisches offentliches Recht und 
Volkerrecht(l975): 51-66. 
58 Meier, G. (1974). "BundesverfassungsgerichtsbeschluB Anmerkung." Neue Juristische Wochenschrif\(48 (1974)): 
1704-1705. 
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Against this wash of criticism, Albert Bleckmann alone saw a positive aspect in the BVerfD's 
decision. He argued that in. the close wording of the decision, an implicit acceptance of both 
Direct Effect and Supremacy could be found, in as much as the BVerfG was arguing that with a 
basic rights catalogue at the EC level, it would no longer have a say in the validity of EC law in 
West Germany'9• 
The West German public remained resolutely pro-integration before, during and after the 
So/ange crisis60• However, mass media coverage, which, if we presume newspaper editors 
attempt to publish stories and perspectives of perceived interests to their readers, became 
increasingly polarized on the question of European legal supremacy over the period between 
1963 and 1975. Early media coverage of European integration during the 1950s and 1960s was 
at first idealistic, and then increasingly disillusioned following French dithering over the EDC, 
the failure of the EPC and the perception of unfair treatment of West German companies within 
the ECSC. As a result, the media lost interest in European integration, typified by the muted 
response to the Treaty of Rome in all the major dailies61 , as well as sparing coverage of the key 
ECJ decisions in 1963 and 1964 . 
. 
A coming to terms with the iinplications of the ECJ' s jurisprudence characterized the phase 
· 1963-1969. At first, the public disinterest meant that coverage of the decisions was scarce, 
particularly as political events (British accession attempts and the Elysees Treaty) monopolized 
the coverage of European events. As a result, it was left to many specialized economic 
publications to begin the discussion on the new legal order emerging from Luxembourg. 
Predominant amongst these was the coverage of the Handelsblatt, whose initial lauding of the 
ECJ was soon replaced by its concerns that the ECJ had made two important mistakes: it had 
gone far enough to polarize the French against integration, but not actually done enough to 
59 Bleckmann, A. (1975). "Zur Funktion des Art 24 Abs I Grundgesetzes." Zeitschrift fiir ausli'mdisches offentliches 
Recht und Volkerrecht: 79-84. 
6° For a range ofEurobarometer results confirming this, see Inglehart, R. and K. Reif(l991). Eurobarometer: The 
Dynamics of European Public Opinion: Essays in Honour of Jacques-Rene Rabier, London: Macrnillan. 
61 The coming to force of the Treaty of Rome on the 1st January 1958 barely made the headlines, reflecting and 
propagating a general passive indifference to the events amongst the general population, typical of the 'permissive 
consensus~ 
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consolidate the European legal system 62• In this second observation lay the most important and 
widespread West German critique of the ECJ. By the mid-1960s, many commentators were 
drawing on the West German constitution to highlight weaknesses in the European order, 
particularly on questions of the division of powers and the protection of the basic rights. In 
essence, media coverage lamented the lack of a 'structural congruence' between the national and 
supranational systems. The juxtaposition of the two constitutional systems was provided with 
more substance by the coverage on the BVerfG's 'Constitutional Rights' ruling with even the 
two well-read broadsheets, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (F AZ/3 and Die Welt64, and the 
well-known periodical, Der Spiegel65 , delivering powerful critiques of the ECJ and willing the 
action "in the Getman point of view"66 
A much fiercer polarization of opinion characterizes media coverage in the period between 1970 
and 1974, particularly due to the continued willingness to compare national and supranational 
systems of governance. Whereas these comparisons took place on specific issues in the 1960s, 
. the 1970s saw a growth in impact-making, generalized headlines about a perceived intrusion on 
the national legal system. For instance, the Handelsblatt ran the headline "Conflict: German and 
EEC Law" in August 1971 for a story covering an ongoing and complicated case before the 
BVertD involving the importation of milk powder67• Shortly thereafter, die Welt newspaper 
declared "Foreign Law is Supreme" in its headline on a story involving a Berlin based furniture 
importer68• On the same story, the Hamburger Abendblatt published under the headline "Legal 
Differences"69• This continued tendency from the 1960s to compare and contrast national and 
European systems, coupled with the BVerfG's de facto acceptance of the ECJ'sjurisprudence at 
the end of the 1960s, prompted the media, as had happened in academia, to examine the 
relationship between the Basic Law and EC legislation. The examination of this question began 
in earnest at the start of 1972. 
62 Unzufrieden mit dem Europa-Gericht", das Handelsblatt, 21.05.1963; "Mit dem Rechtsschutz hapert es in der 
EWG", das Handelsblalt, 05.05.1964; ,EWG-Verordnungen verfassungswidrig?", das Handelsblatt, 13.02.1964 
63 
,Urteile machen Geschichte", FAZ, 22.02.1965 
64 No title, Die Welt, 06.10.1965 
65 Spiegel, 04.03.1964 
66 
"Es wird Sache der Bundesregierung sein, den deutschen Standpunkt zu vettreten", in no title, Die Welt, 
06.10.1965 
67 
"Konflikt: Deutsches und EWG-Recht", Handelsblatt, 20.08.1971 
68 
"Ausliindisches Recht hat Vorrang", die Welt, 03.11.1971 
69 
,Rechtsunterschiede", Hamburger Abendblatt, 19.07.1972 
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In April 1972, the Ludwigshafen-based newspaper, the Rheinpfalz, published a commentary on a 
television broadcast, "Recht im Gesprach", from the Mainz-based public service station ZDF 
involving an interview with the President of the BVerfG, Ernst Benda. In the program, Benda 
had advocated the creation of a catalogue of fundamental rights for the EC, similar to the basic 
rights in the FRG's constitution70• He claimed this to be the solution to the complex dilemma 
posed by the penetration ofEC law into the FRG's constitutional life, namely the recognition of 
supreme, effective EC legislation juxtaposed against the urgency in not simply abandoning 
"legitimate German interests" and the carefully created West German constitutional order. 
Benda saw his role, holding such an influential position, as a mediator to ensure an avoidance of 
conflict between the two legal systems. This would be achieved through a transposition of the 
FRG's basic rights to a general community wide fundamental rights provision. Such a clear and 
strong belief in the value of the West German constitutional order was countered only partly in 
the program by the ECJ's German judge, Hans Kutscher, who claimed that the growth ofEC law 
has actually increased the provision of fundamental rights to European citizens. 
Shortly thereafter, Benda's wish to influence the creation of European basic rights began to come 
into fruition, as the Frankfurt Administrative Court (FAC) made its reference to the BVerfG that 
would result in the latter's Solange I decision. Coverage of this reference was unsurprisingly 
limited geographically to the Frankfurt papers. The Frankfurter Rundschau reported factually on 
the reference in May 1972, citing the astonishment of EC lawyers that the F AC would question 
the constitutionality ofEC law again, after the BVerfG had already ruled on this issue in 196i1• 
Such action raised potentially difficult consequences for the EC. In a further editorial in the 
same issue, the paper wrote that every German citizen should have full judicial protection against 
potentially unconstitutional EC law, and therefore it could not criticize the FAC's reference to 
the B V erfG 72 • It conceded that the Communities were extremely complex legal institutions, in 
which national interest played a cursory role, but it also asserted that the rights of the citizen 
must always take precedence. 
70 
,Fi.ir europaische Grundrechte", die Rheinpfalz, 18.04.1972 
71 
,EWG-Verordnung in Karlsruhe unter der Lupe'', Frankfurter Rundschau, 12.05.1972 
72 
,Rechtssicherheit hat Vorrang", Frankfurter Rundschau, 12.05.1972 
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The FAC's reference and the general question of the constitutionality of EC legislation had 
become in this way an important news story. It must also be remembered that in this period of 
the mid-1970s, the BVerfG had gained both political and public prominence due to a series of 
high profile political cases held before it, not the least its decision on tbe constitutionality of 
Brandt's Ostpolitik in 197;1 73 As a result, the question of how to protect the Basic Rights was 
never far fromthe headlines over the following two years. 
In October 1973, the Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung examined the question not from the 
national viewpoint, but at what the ECJ had been doing to accommodate national concerns, in 
particular with reference to two cases involving the ECJ from the local region. In one case, the 
Court conferred the same guaranteed rights as German workers onto an Italian migrant worker in 
Augsburg, which the paper welcomed as a confirmation that rights can be protected through the 
European legal mechanisms without costs for the individual. The second case was the Stauder 
vs. Ulm 74 decision, in which the ECJ declared fundamental rights protection was an integral part 
of EC legislation. The paper referred to the case, if not specifically by name or witb an 
assessment of its true importance, as a "triumph of the individual"75 , declaring in conclusion that 
such successes were a reason to forget the smaller problems of domestic politics. 
Another regional paper, the Mannheimer Morgenpost, reported on the meeting of the judges 
from the various levels of federal and state constitutional courts76 found in the FRG's legal 
system. It stated that the main talking point was the relationship between the Basic Law and EC 
legislation and that the most difficult task facing the West German legal community was the 
transposition of a comparable fundamental rights catalogue, with the Basic Law as a model, on 
to the EC. The problematic, the article claimed, stemmed from the inability of the Member 
States to agree on a suitable level of rights protection in the original treaties. This proved, 
according to the judges in discussion, particularly disadvantageous to the FRG, whose "system 
of Basic Rights is more developed than anywhere else"77 This political failure would make it 
almost impossible to introduce a catalogue through the political arena and instead the judges 
73 See Sacker, H. (2003). Das Bundesverfassungsgericht, Bonn: Bundeszentrale flir politische Bildung. 
74 Case 29/69 Stauder vs. Ulm [1969] European Court Report 419 
75
"In Europajedem sein Recht", Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung, 19.10.1973 
76 As well as the ECJ Judge, Hans Kutscher 
77 
,Grundrechte auf dem europaischen Markt", Mannheimer Morgenpost, 26.10.1973 
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agreed that it was best left to the judiciary, i.e. the ECJ to develop its own fundamental rights 
provisions78• This provides the further insight that, alongside Erns! Benda's revelation from the 
previous year79, the highest levels ofthe West German judiciary were openly seeking to prompt 
the ECJ through judicial, public and academic dialogue into developing a basic rights catalogue 
comparable to that of the FRG. Clearly, they believed the ECJ would pay credence to such 
debates at the national level. 
The Handelsblatt however remained critical that such an approach could work. It wrote that 
there was no guarantee that if the ECJ were to undertake such a task, that it would choose to 
mimic the West German model. Instead, it was far more likely to use the lowest common 
denominator between the Member States, resulting in a retardation of the Basic Law, the "most 
progressive national constitution" and its basic rights80• With the media awaiting the BVerfG's 
decision on the FAC's reference, and leading judicial personalities raising the possibility of an 
inter-court dialogue to solve the basic rights dilemma, the tension entering 1974 was palpable as 
newspaper tried to keep the issue in public attention. Under the headline "Here is where the 
national cow is slaughtered", the Rheinische Post published a long and detailed survey of the 
composition and activities of the ECJ since its inception in 195281 • Claiming that despite its 
importance, ruling over nine states and 250 million citizens, the existence of the Court was 
unknown to many. After outlining the nature of the Court, the paper decided that the ECJ held 
an overtly political role, deciding independently from and between national interests. 
Shortly after the Rheinische Post published its critique of the ECJ, the BVerfG issued its Solange 
decision. Coverage of the decision occurred throughout the media spectrum, with some 
newspapers going beyond the mere factual reports and dedicating editorial opinion to the 
situation. The reaction to the decision was divided, mirroring the opinion in the BVerfG itself. 
The Hannoverische Allgemeine Zeitung was critical of the BVerfG in the extreme. It wrote that 
the already shaken EC had received a further "knock" from the BVerfG, which could unleash 
78
"In Europajedem sein Recht", Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung, 19.10.1973 
79 
,,Fi.ir europaische Grundrechte", die Rheinpfalz, 18.04.1972 
80 
,Europarecht bricht das nationale Verfassungsrecht", Handelsblatt, 30.10.1973 
81 
"Hier wird die nationale Kuh geschlachtet", Rheinische Post, 31.05.1974 
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dangerous long-tenn consequences for the Community82 The damage was twofold, with the 
decision raising the danger that the European legal system could splinter, and denying the ECJ an 
"earned" vote of confidence from the national level. The result of this is the threat that the EC 
legal order could simply "fall apart", before the ECJ has fully completed it. Admittedly, the 
article conceded, the BVer:fG limited its power of review until that time that the EC held its own 
comparable set of basic rights, but the paper argued this condition would be impossible to fulfil! 
in the "foreseeable future", because only Italy, out of the other eight Member States, had a 
comparable constitution to the Basic Law. Moreover, the chance of reaching the political 
agreement needed to bolster the European Parliament according to the tenus of the BVer:fG was 
unthinkable. The article went on to cast doubt on the validity of the decision by highlighting the 
fact that the BVerfG's opinion was so divided, and that the argument posited by the majority 
opinion felt "suspiciously self-righteous". It concluded that the BVerfG dealt Europe yet another 
defeat. 
In a second article on the decision, the paper stressed the further "disagreeable" result of the 
decision: a patchwork of EC legislation, valid in some Member States and not in others83• The 
Siiddeutsche Zeitung provided a similar. It also referred to the Solange I decision as a "blow" 
for the integration process. It also, however, emphasized that the decision was limited both in 
scope - the BVer:fG had turned out the initial complaint and still refused to hear cases directly 
against EC law - and time - the decision was valid only as long as the EC did not have a 
comparable fundamental rights provision84• The Stuttgarter Zeitung was also critical of the 
decision, believing it to have created a "special status" for the FRG and exposed that danger, 
under which the EC legal order stood. The Stuttgarter Nachrichten also carried a commentary 
laced with irony on the decision, asking whether it was right or not that EC law be measured 
against "our good constitution"85 • 
However, several voices in the media supported the BVerfG's decision. The Kieler Nachrichten 
issued the most active support. Writing under the headline "The European Ill", the article 
82 
,StaB aus Karlsruhe", Hannoverische Allgemeine Zeitung, 14.08.1974 
83 
,Bundesverfassungsgericht will EG-Recht i.iberprtifen", Hannoverische Allgemeine Zeitung, 14.08.1974 
84 
,Grundgesetz geht vor EG-Recht", Sliddeutsche Zeitung, 14.08.1974 
85 
,Kautionsklauseln", StuttgarterNachrichten, 15.08.1974 
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praised the "courage" of the BVerfG in voicing the opinion of the "great majority of Europeans" 
towards the European integration process and calling to question the democratic failings of the 
EC86• It claimed the BVerfG, through its decision, underlined the lack of democratic legitimacy 
in a Community run by a "bureaucratic apparatus" (Commission), a Council, which was not 
answerable to any parliament, and a European Parliament, whose existence was merely 
"theoretical". Moreover, the ECJ had based its jurisprudence on the presumption of supremacy 
of EC law over national law without actually considering the importance that this law should 
stem from a "democratic" system. 
Other sources, while not openly critical of the decision, remained only lukewarm in their support 
for the BVerfG. For instance, die Welt newspaper published merely a cursory mention of the 
case, despite it making the headlines in the other broadsheets87 • The Mannheimer Morgenpost 
also printed a solely factual reconstruction of the case, without any commentary pro or contra the 
decision88• The Frankfurter Rundschau, which had earlier welcomed the reference made by the 
FACto the BVerfG, placed a lot of emphasis on the reasoning made by the FAC, rather than the 
BVerfG, with almost a third of the article dedicated to the Frankfurt Court, but also made no 
commentary on the nature of the BVerfG's decision. 
The other Frankfurt newspaper, the FAZ, provided the most subtle, even covert, support for the 
BVerfG's decision. In its wording of its report, the FAZ frequently referred to the Basic Law as 
"our" constitution or to "our" basic rights catalogue89, implying an implicit association with the 
BVerfG's choice to defend the national constitution against the externalized European order. 
The wording of the FAZ's article stands out, as in all of the coverage of the Solange I decision, 
this is the only time that this possessive pronoun is used (except for the singular ironic use in the 
Stuttgarter Nachrichten90) and is particularly unusual for the FAZ's otherwise measured style. In 
a further commentary in its economics section, the F AZ denied some the critique leveled at the 
decision. In particular, it claimed that the fears that the EC legal system will disintegrate were 
unfounded and that the wording of the BVerfG's decision had made the Solange-clause a last 
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,Europiiisches Ubel", Kieler Nachrichten, 15.08.1974 
87 
"Verfassungsgericht schriinkt EG-Recht ein", die Welt, 15.08.1974 
88 
"Deutsches Recht geht vor Europarecht", Mannheimer Morgenpost, 14.08.1974 
89 
,V orrang der Grundrechte vor de m europaischen Gemeinschaftsrecht", F AZ, 15.08.197 4 
90 
,Grundgesetz geht vor EG-Recht", Stiddeutsche Zeitung, 14.08.1974 
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minute "emergency brake" to prevent an infringement on the basic rights91 • Moreover, it 
claimed that instead of complaining, the ECJ should understand the Solange I decision as a call 
for strengthening and improving the EC legal system. Following the logic. of the decision, the 
ECJ should introduce a catalogue of fundamental rights, which, if not identical to the West 
German model, should use this as a paragon for their development. This was not, so claimed the 
FAZ, an "axe to the roots" of the Community. 
However, the immediate reaction from the European institutions, in particular the Commission, 
was to criticize the Solange I decision, a fact that received plenty of attention in the West 
German press. The F AZ reported on the "dramatic tone"92 of the letter of complaint written by 
the Commission and given to the Federal Government. It argued that the letter was paradoxical, 
since it was addressed to a government which actually shared the Commission's view on the 
case, but was nominally responsible externally for all the acts of the federal institutions, in this 
case the BVerfG. Die Welt, after only reporting cursorily on the Solange I decision itself, 
published two articles on the Commission's angry reaction to the BVerfG. Covering extensively 
the arguments given by the Commission's chosen spokesperson, Guido Brunner, one of the 
FRG's Commissioners, the report stated that the vast majority of legal academic opinion had 
accepted the autonomy of the EC legal system and this precluded any right of the BVerfG to 
judge on the validity of EC legislation93 • In a second article on the subject, the paper criticized 
the Commission's position much more strongly. Stating that it had taken the Commission more 
than six months to respond to the Solange decision in this manner, die Welt article called into 
question the working effectiveness of the Commission as an institution94• Its reaction provided 
fuel for the widespread critique of the Brussels "technocracy". Noting too the difficulty in which 
the Commission was placing the Federal Government, the article believed this was an attempt to 
close the lid on a "Pandora's box" of legal consequences emanating from the decision. The 
report continued to state that, if other supreme courts followed the BV erfG' s suit, then, similar to 
the FAZ's reckoning95 , the Solange I decision would indeed represent an axe blow to the core of 
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,,Kein Tiefschlag flir Europa", F AZ, 16.09.1974 
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"Die Kommission kritisiert das Bundeverfassungsgericht", F AZ, 21.12.1974 
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the EC96• The Die Welt article demonstrated also however, that this could prove to be an 
overreaction to the situation. It claimed, the Solange doctrine was intellectually limited, binding 
neither the First Senate of the BVerfG, which had denied the ability to rule on EC law in 1967 
nor truly taking into account the nature of the transfer of sovereignty made through Article 24 (i) 
BL. 
In the face of increasingly vitriolic media and academic debates, the BVerfG's reasoning in the 
Solange decision is increasingly simple to explain. Concerned by the lack of 'structural 
congruence' - predominately in the realms of parliamentary representation and fundamental 
rights provision - between the national and European levels, the court moved to increase the 
salience of these issues for the supranational institutions. The 'structural congruence' argument 
was a central theme in both academic and media debates from the 1960s onwards. 
Yet we still face one puzzle- why was the West German government so reluctant or unable to 
act on the concerns of so many of its citizens? In essence, why did the German government not 
take the steps made by the BVerfD itself? To an extent, it had. A primary concern of the 
German Foreign Office during the 1960s had been to increase the legitimacy and influence of 
the European Parliament. 
Despite this, the government remained inert in response to the ECJ and its positioning as the 
Community's constitutional court in the V an Gend and Costa decisions. Government figures in 
the AA and the Economics Ministry were vaguely aware of the importance of the ECJ's 
decisions and saw some benefits in the expansion of EC law to overcome diplomatic problems, 
particularly with the French. However, there is little evidence to suggest that there was a 
systematic attempt to pursue or allow legal integration because political integration was so 
stagnant. Even the government's submission to the ECJ on the crucially important Van Gend en 
Loos case was the result of a low-level administrator over-stepping his competencies, and 
thereby incurring the wrath of his superiors97• Discussion of legal developments rarely took 
place in the political decision making areas of the AA, even if the State Secretary, Karl Carstens, 
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,Spate Reaktion aus Briissel", die Welt, 30.12.1974 
97 See Davies, B. (2007). Constitutionalising the European Community: West Germany Between Legal Sovereignty 
and European Integration, 1949-1975. European Studies/Gennan. London, King's College London. PhD. 
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held a keen interest in Community law and published on the topic in the academic debates of the 
1960s. 
Most importantly though, a strongly pro-integration stance was locked into the official policy of 
the Federal Republic right from the start of its existence. Not only did the Basic Law include 
specific articles allowing for the transfer of sovereignty to international organizations, but also it 
is important to remember the overwhelming importance ofKonrad Adenauer98 in the early FRG. 
At the start of the FRG, Adenauer was three people rolled into one: the most dominant political 
character in Bonn, Federal Chancellor, and Foreign Minister (to the extent that the occupied state 
could have one). This meant that European policy- even when it dealt with the technical details 
of economic integration- was the remit of the Foreign Office and this had a default mode set to 
the pro-integrationist stance of the Chancellor. Only once Ludwig Erhard replaced Adenauer did 
the Economics Ministry gain more say. That took place in 1963 - nine months after the 
publication of Van Gend en Loos. The timing was a recurring theme: Indeed, to some extent 
also, other events distracted the political leadership at the most inopportune times, with, for 
example, changes in leadership coinciding with major court cases and decisions99• 
Indeed, a crucial element in understanding the passivity of the West German bureaucracy is the 
internal structural constellation. Prompted by models of the West German administration 
provided by Katzenstein100 and Bulmer and Patterson101 , the unclear delineation of competencies 
and the subsequent competition for the leadership of European policy between the Foreign and 
Economics Ministries resulted in the sidelining of the two so-called "Constitutional Ministries"-
the Justice and Interior Ministries. This is important, as both held clear concerns about the ECJ's 
decisions. The result of this was that the monitoring of EC Jaw in the West German 
administration balanced between the Economics Ministry, monitoring law of a technical nature, 
98 There are numerous excellent biographies of Adenauer and analyses of his tenure. His own memoirs are an 
excellent place to start: Adenauer, K. (1966). Memoirs 1945-1963, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 
99 Most noticeably, the switch between Erhard and Adenauer in the middle of the publications of Van Gend en Loos 
and Costa and even more importantly, the resignation of Brandt due to the Guillerme Affair two weeks before the 
BVerfG's Solange I decision in May 1974 
10
° Katzenstein, P. J. (1987). Policy and Politics in West Germany: The Growth of a Semi-sovereign State, 
Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
101 Bulmer, S. and W. Paterson (I 987). The Federal Republic of Germany and the European Community, London, 
Alien and Unwin. 
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and the Foreign Office, monitoring legal developments with a political character. Only at the 
point of the Solange decision did the Constitutional Ministries play a central role in the 
formation of the FRG's European policy. The people best qualified to understand the domestic 
implications of the ECJ's decisions were shut out from the start102• 
Yet by the time of Solange case, the constitutionalisation process deeply divided the 
Constitutional Ministries were both between each other and within themselves. Whilst the 
Justice Minister Ewald Bucher was famously criticized for being so anti-ECJ, many of the 
Justice Ministry's employees revealed their embarrassment of this situation to their ministerial 
counterparts103• This also reflected the fact that many of the constitutional specialists within the 
Constitutional Ministries participated in heated academic debates occurring at the same time. 
The result of this was that the Justice Ministry spent several months delaying the government's 
response to the BVerfG, creating a weak, watered down technical rejection of the So/ange I 
decision. This pleased no one, highlighted the divisions within the administration and incurred 
the anger of the European Commission, who publicly criticized the government and the BVerfD 
in an open letter to the West German media. 
Ultimately; the fallout from the So/ange decision hit the government hardest. It followed the 
reaction to the BVerfG's decision in May 1974 with interest, with newspaper cuttings and 
academic reviews being collected by the BIM104• In August 1974, the Justice Minister Hans-
Jochen Vogel verbally informed the new cabinet under Chancellor Helmut Schmidt105 of the 
implications of the So/ange decision, warning of a potential conflict between the ECJ and the 
BVerfG106• In order to minimize the potential for this, the BMJ was instructed to take up 
unofficial contact with the Judicial Service of the Commission to assess the mood in Brussels 
102 The implications of the institutional constellation in the FRG and the continual sidelining of the Constitutional 
Ministries are discussed at length in Davies, B. (2007). Constitutionalising the European Community: West 
Germany Between Legal Sovereignty and European Integration, 1949-1975. European Studies/Gennan. London, 
King's College London. PhD. 
103 Letter, 29'" September 1967, in PAA-B20-200-1662 Allgemeine Rechtsfragen nicht Jnstitutionelle Art (4 Nov 
1966-30 Juni 1970) · 
104 BA B106 39568 Bundesinnenministerium: Vereinbarkeit von EWG-Recht mit dem Grundgesetz. Band 4: Feb 
1973 -Dez 1974 
105 Willy Brandt resigned as Chancellor in May 1974, two weeks before the Solange Decision due to a scandal 
involving an East German spy in the Chancellor's Office. 
106 See Letter, 5th September 1974 in BA BI06 39568 Bundesinnenministerium: Vereinbarkeit von EWG-Recht mit 
dem Grundgesetz. Band 4: Feb I 973- Dez 1974 
24 I Page 
.) 
towards the BVerfG and West Germany as a whole. The meeting took place in October 1974 
and showed that the Commission felt the need to make a strong response to the BVerfG, even to 
the point of taking West Germany to the ECJ under the infringement proceeding of Art 169 
EC107 • A French MEP even wrote to the Commission to instigate this procedure108• However, 
the BJM representative argued that the BV erfG had ignored the opinion of the government, 
which in basis was also that of the Commission. If the Commission were to attack the 
government, this would only fuel anti-integration feeling in the Federal Republic. When this was 
reported back to Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in a cabinet meeting at the end of October 1974, he 
stated the need for West German representatives at the EC to ensure all legislation would meet 
the basic rights provision with the Basic Law. However, the government had not escaped a 
reaction by the Commission. In December 1974, Commission President Ortoli of the wrote to 
Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher to criticize the Solange decision and called upon the 
government to consider ways in which the damage to the integration process by the BVerfG 
should be minimized109• At the same time, the press received a copy of the letter, which the 
German media roundly attacked110• 
The negotiations and behind-the-scenes trading that occurred after the BVerfG's decision in May 
1974 lasted well into the late 1970s and the government attempts to minimize and deal with the 
fallout to the case was truly remarkable. It reveals the government's rather desperate attempts to 
avoid the Commission initiating infringement proceedings against Germany at the ECJ. 
Certainly now though, legal integration and its consequences within the national systems was top 
of the political agenda. The European Specialists from across all of the Federal ministries 
discussed different options of dealing with the political fallout to the BVerfG's decision at a 
number of high-level political meetings running right into late-1970s. Top priority was, 
according to the results of one such meeting, giving the press and other commentators no reasons 
107 Memo, 91h October 1974 in BA Bl06 39568 Bundesinnenministerium: Vereinbarkeit von EWG-Recht mit dem 
Grundgesetz. Band 4: Feb 1973- Dez 1974 
108 See Memo, 91h October 1974 in BA 8106 39568 Bundesinnenministerium: Vereinbarkeit von EWG-Recht mit 
dem Grundgesetz. Band 4: Feb 1973- Dez 1974. The French Gaullist MEP Coustet raised this proposal in a 
written question (414/74) on 8th October 1974. 
109 See Letter, 191h December 1974, in BA 8106 39568 Bundesinnenministerium: Vereinbarkeit von EWG-Recht 
mit dem Grundgesetz. Band 4: Feb 1973- Dez 1974 
110 See for example "Die Kommission kritisiert das Bundeverfassungsgericht", F AZ, 21.12.1974 
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to play up the importance of the stori 11 • The government indicated it had no desire to play the 
role of poster-boy for elements within the Community keen to undermine the power and integrity 
of its legal system112• This was not entirely successful as, in July 1975, the British Embassy in 
Bonn forwarded a letter to the Foreign Office asking to host a Parliamentary Scrutiny Committee 
coming from London, which wanted to learn more from the West Germans about promoting 
national oversight over the Community institutions! 113 • 
Despite this, a long series of negotiations between the Justice Ministry, the European Legal 
Service and the Commission through into 1976 allowed for a political solution to the dilemma. 
The Commission did not want to raise the intensity of the debate and was willing to hold off 
from the threatened infringement proceedings114• This suited the West German approach down 
to the ground. Instead, behind the scenes, negotiations began about a compromise first suggested 
by the German Advocate General at the ECJ, Gerhard Reischl, in late 1974, which would see the 
Community tied officially to the standards of rights protection found in the European Convention 
of Human Rights 115 • Whilst the Chancellor himself found the suggestion "sufficient and 
practical", 116 there were some reservations in the Justice Ministry about whether this went far 
enough117 • Despite these, the Justice Ministry seemed willing to accept this as a compromise, 
especially after receiving notification from the Embassy in Rome later that year that the Italian 
Constitutional Court ruled in its Chimiche case in a manner mirroring the BVerfG's Solange 
decision 118 • It seemed that the overarching goal of a functioning, effective Community legal 
system was more important to the Germans at this point and compromise seemed the lesser of 
two evils. The threat of growing fragmentation of the Community legal system at the hands of 
111 Ressortsbesprechung, 6" January 1975 in PAA-424.50- Grundrechte und EG-Rechte- 121874 
112 A point which was emphasised in a letter to a Cabinet meeting at the Chancellor's Office by the Justice Minister 
in October, 1974- Letter from Vogel to Bundeskanzleramt, 171h October 1974 in PAA-424.50- Grundrechte und 
EG-Rechte- 121874 
113 Letter from British Embassy, 91h July 1975 in PAA-424.50- Grundrechte und EG-Rechte- 121874 
114 Letter from Seidel (Economics) to Teske (Justice) and AA, 121h January 1976 in PAA-424.50- Grundrechte und 
EG-Rechte- 121874 
115 Letter to Chancellor Schmidt from Reischl from 14" November 1974, in PAA-424.50- Grundrechte und EG-
Rechte- 121875 
116 Letter to Reisch1 from Chancellor Schmidt from 91h December 1974, in PAA-424.50- Grundrechte und EG-
Rechte- 121875 
117 Outline from Justice to Foreign Ministry from 161h April 1975, in PAA-424.50- Grundrechte und EG-Rechte-
121874 
118 30 October 1975, n. 232, Societa industrie chimiche Italia centrale (lC.lC.}, in Giur. Cost. 221 I 
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the constitutional courts in Germany and Italy would also go a long way in explaining the Joint 
Declaration of the Community institutions in J97i 19• 
With the political fallout from the Commission seemingly mollified, there just remained the 
question of dealing with the domestic protagonist- the BVerfG. The ministries had already 
discussed several possible ways of working around the court's decision. One suggestion 
involved using the historically pro-integration First Senate of the court (which had ruled in the 
Constitutional Rights case in 1967) against the Second (which had ruled in Solange) 120• Other 
more drastic options floated- notably from the European Legal Service - included changing the 
laws that established the BVerfG, as well as constitutional amendment to make integration 
easier121 • Whilst none of· these options was deemed viable, German representatives in the 
Community were asked through a direct intervention of the Chancellor to ensure that 
Community legislation did not break any fundamental rights provisions122• 
Moreover, the government took steps to isolate and exclude the Second Senate of the BVerfG, 
particularly its Vice-President, Waiter Seuffert. Seuffert wrote to the Foreign Office to enquire 
more about the Commission's letter to Germany in December 1974, and on receipt of the reply 
went straight to Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher to express his dismay with the 
Commission's actions, asking the government to show solidarity with the court and to allow the 
BVerfG aid in drafting the government's response. This, however, was something that the 
ministries were not willing to do. Instead, Seuffert, despite repeated requests through January 
and February 1975, was denied access to the drafts of the government's response to the 
Commission's letters. Indeed, the Justice Ministry sent later ECJ judge, Kai Bahlmann, who 
then led its Public Law section, to speak with Seuffert and pass on news of his exclusion because 
this was now a political, not legal issue123 • Seuffert did not take the news well 124 and so appealed 
directly to Chancellor Schmidt, who in the presence of both Foreign and Justice Ministers 
119 See above and "Joint Declaration by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission", in Official 
Journal of the European Communities (OJEC). 27.04.1977, No C 103, pp. I. 
120 Outline from Justice on 5'" September 1974, in PAA-424.50- Grundrechte und EG-Rechte- 121874 
121 Memo from Foreign on 81h October 1974, in PAA-424.50- Grundrechte und EG-Rechte- 121874 
122 Protocols ofthe 87 Meeting of the Cabinet of the Federal Government on 61h November 1974. 
123 Report from the State Secretary Committee on European Affairs on 21st February 1975, in PAA-424.50-
Grundrechte und EG-Rechte- 121874 
124 Letter from Bahlmann to Foreign on 18'h March 1975, in PAA-424.50- Grundrechte und EG-Rechte- 121874 
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ensured that Seuffert would see the government's response before it was sent. As a result, the 
\ 
Chancellor's Office requested in late March 1975 a copy of the ministries' draft letter to the 
Commission, which until that point, the ministries had deemed unnecessary to send to the cabinet 
level. Reluctantly, and wary of provoking a domestic constitutional battle with the BVerfG, the 
Foreign and Justice Ministries sent the letter to the Chancellor's Office in April 1975 125• At a 
pre-meeting briefing for the cabinet discussion, the Foreign Office legal section informed the 
Justice and Foreign Ministry State Secretaries that at all costs, Seuffert should be excluded from 
adding to the draft- notably this point was capitalized and underlined in the document126• The 
Foreign Ministry claimed that this was now a political matter and the government could neither 
have its "hands tied" by the court nor have Seuffert "cause problems". It is somewhat ironic then 
that the result of the cabinet meeting was the decision to have the two State Secretaries meet 
Seuffert to discuss the contents of the letter127• It was even more so that, when the meeting took 
place at the end of May 1975, Seuffert had a paragraph prepared that he demanded be included in 
the letter and declared that he would call the Foreign Ministry with additional amendments in 
June128 • The paragraph, which denied the claim that the BVerfG was trying to undermine the 
coherence of the Community legal system, was ultimately included in the German response. 
After Seuffert kept his promise of calling again in June, this time with no additional 
amendments, the letter was signed, sealed, and delivered to the Commission in June 1975. This 
was not quite the end of the story, as the Legal Committee of the European Parliament expressed 
its concern with the Solange decision in October 1975, but by that time, neither Commission nor 
the German government had the desire to fight so by the start of 1976, the BP's concerns were 
brushed aside. 
Conclusion 
Due to the political constraints of the FRG's post-war position, institutional blockages in the 
domestic system, and the close handling of policy by a dedicated supranational elite, these 
concerns could or would not be uttered by the government in the European political arena 
Instead, it fell upon the BVerfG to articulate the critiques. The court had waited for a consensus 
125 Letter from State Secretary of JUstice to State Secretary of Foreign containing letter to Chancellor's Office with 
combined Foreign-Justice position from 24'h April 1975 in PAA-424.50- Grundrechte und EG-Rechte- 121874 
126 Letter from Legal Section on 29'h April 1975 in PAA-424.50- Grundrechte und EG-Rechte- 121874 
127 Cabinet Protocol from 20'h April 1975 
128 Meeting report from 23'' May 1975 in PAA-424.50- Grundrechte und EG-Rechte- 121874 
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to emerge in the academic and media spheres and its Solange decision represented these views 
closely: there simply was not enough similarity, or congruence, between the Basic Law and the 
European 'constitutional' system for the unconditional acceptance of European legal supremacy 
and direct effect. The message of the court was clear: with certain improvements, the situation 
would be different. 
The documentation of West German resistance to developments in the European legal arena 
matters because the changes that this prompted force us to recast our understanding of the 
formative period of the European legal system. We might presuppose that the court decision that 
led to the institutionalization of human rights in European jurisprudence and governance has its 
initial impulse in discourse in West Germany in the early 1950s. The structural congruence 
argument, raised originally in relation to the European Defense Community, remained alive and 
relevant in West German legal academia until it was taken up as a template for the Solange 
decision in 1974. Even in the public sphere, assumed by most to be uninterested and inertly 
permissive of European affairs in this period, took note of the ECJ's actions and in the same 
methodology of comparison, increasingly found better qualities in the domestic system. Even if 
legal integration was not headline news at the start of the period, it was by the mid -1970s. The 
FCC, already the proactive guardian of the Basic Law, watched this consensus emerge before 
issuing the 1974 judgment. The comparative qualities of the national and European system 
today still provide inspiration for the FCC to condition its acceptance of European legislation and 
modes of governance. The failure to have comparative parliamentary controls over the executive 
at the European level was the ground for the FCC's recent Lisbon decision, which too, following 
this logic, has its intellectual origins in the debates of the 1950s. 
Faced with this act of resistance by the largest Member State's most legitimate public body, the 
Commission and Court backed down, implementing important and lasting changes to the 
European system of judicial and political governance. Through West German resistance, human 
rights were institutionalized at the Community level. What ultimately emerges as German 
European policy is a compromise between competing and complimentary national and sub-
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national, state and non-state preferences. As such, we might more accurately understand the 
Constitutional Court's Solange decision as a product of German judicial, public and academic 
opinion, with an overwhelmed governmental response always some distance behind. This 
conditions our understanding of the passive consensus and the idea that integration was an elite 
imposed project. While that is in some part indeed the case, we can now document the push 
back by increasingly interested and vocal public and intellectual forces within the Member States 
and how, through the national court systems, this gathered political momentum, which in the 
case of Germany, is arguably still being felt today. 
Clearly then, of the new research being undertaken by historians on the EU' s legal system, 
reception studies of European law within the Member States are some of the most important. 
Such analyses face the complexity of coming to grips with the national idiosyncrasies of the 
Member States. In the case reviewed here, we must first locate the dynamics of reception within 
the unique political culture of the FRG. Its willingness to 'sacrifice' national interests and 
financial aid in the name of an ever closer union is a product of an exceptional set of 
circumstances that the FRG found itself in at its founding in 1949. The bureaucratic and 
institutional constellations and traditions - with ministries at competitive loggerheads over 
competencies and a supremely powerful and legitimate constitutional court - are equally 
products of the national historical context. Without these factors in place in our narrative, it is 
impossible to accurately explain why the Solange case came about and why it was the BVerfG 
and not the FRG government that resisted the ECJ. Focus on the national, on the particular, is 
crucial in explaining the formation of European law, even if our first instincts point us toward the 
ECJ, the Legal Service and the other supra- or transnational elements of the system. As is 
evident from this study, the national reaction has been of particular importance in the molding of 
the European legal system. 
It is crucial to note that despite the apparent disinterest in legal integration vis-a-vis its political 
or economic corollaries, Law now certainly mattered. Not only was the Justice Ministry drawn 
in centrally in to the formation of European policy, but also the court cases and the 
jurisprudential implications were being discussed at the very highest political levels within the 
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Foreign Office and even the Chancellor himself was involved. In perhaps one way, the real, 
vibrant legal history of European integration- at least in Germany- begins in May 1974. By the 
late 1960s, West Germans were increasingly comfortable with their own national constitution 
and were happy to use it as a standard to which the Community should aspire. Unfortunately, in 
the ever more explicit comparisons between national and supranational constitutional orders, 
both in academic and public spheres, the success of the national merely highlighted the 
democratic and judicial failings of the European. The increased pride in the national 
constitutional order came at the expense of greater disillusionment with the integration project. 
The issues raised in the public and academic debates -most specifically, the concerns about the 
protection of the fundamental rights provisions of the Basic Law - were in reality expressed by 
the jurisprudence of the FCC in the Solange decision. Far from being an "extreme position"129, 
the Solange case in fact reflected, to a large extent, opinion in both academia and public opinion. 
At the time, the FCC was heavily criticized for the decision. Many scholars and commentators 
saw the FCC's actions as merely means to secure its power vis-a-vis the ECJ, something which 
pro-integrationists found entirely undesirable130. Yet, when the words of two FCC Justices 131 are 
taken into account, it is clear that the intention of the FCC was to provoke the ECJ into action 
regarding the creation and protection of fundamental rights at the supranational level. It could, 
of course, be countered that Benda and Seuffert were hiding the true intentions of the FCC 
behind the fayade of promoting basic rights, while in reality securing the position of the FCC 
against the ECJ. Subsequent FCC jurisprudence, most notably the So/ange II decision132, in 
which the FCC renounced its desire to test European law against the fundamental rights, also 
demonstrates that the FCC was happy to accept supremacy and direct effect after the ECJ had 
worked to develop fundamental rights protection at the European level in Stauder vs. U/m and 
129 Scheuring, "The Approach to European Law in German Jurisprudence.", pg 16 
130 See above all else, the legal academic reception of the Sola~ge case in Chapter Two. 
Scholars such as Ipsen, Riegel, Hilf, and Meier were outspoken in their critique of the decision. 
131 See Seuffert, "Grundgesetz Und Gemeinschaftsrecht." and Benda, "Das Spannungsverhaltnis Van 
Grundrechten Und Obernationalen Recht.", pp 395-6. See also subsequent media publications and 
interviews with Benda, especially ,Zur Frage der Schaffung eines europaischen Grundrechtskatalog", 
interview with Ernst Benda, Deutsche Welle, 09.04.1975 and ,Fur europaische Grundrechte", die 
Rheinpfalz, 18.04.1972 
132 2 BvR 197/83- Solange 11 decision, 22"' October 1986- BVerfGE 73, 339. The FCC has, since Solange 
1/, reiterated its desire to test European law against the Basic law following the Maastricht Treaty. 
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No/d. While Alter133 and Stone Sweet134 argue that Solange was indeed the cue for the ECJ to 
move on basic rights, other scholars, particularly Tomuschat have accused the FCC of pursuing a 
policy of"basic rights imperialism"135, forcing the West German model onto the European stage. 
By contrast, this book reveals quite evidently that the securing of fundamental rights both in the 
national constitution and at the European level was a central concern for both the public and 
legal-academia for almost a decade before the Solange decision. 
That, in either case, the national constitution could be seen by West Germans as a model for the 
whole of (integrated) Europe provides new insights into the double process through which West 
Germans re-shaped their own self-understanding and the image portrayed to the outside world. 
In regard to the latter, there was evident concern among public and ministerial opinion that the 
Solange case be interpreted by the other Member States as the start of a period of national 
recalcitrance. Clearly, a positive reception of European legal integration was also a means for 
the West Germans to prove to its neighbours that the new state really did wish to subsume its 
own interests for the good of an integrated Europe136• Many scholars did indeed call the 
acceptance of lesser basic rights provision at the supranationallevel a 'sacrifice' that the Federal 
Republic had to make in the name of integration 137• Yet despite this, the FCC did indeed see fit 
to act, even if this provoked the highly embarrassing threat of infringement proceedings from the 
Commission138• This is clear evidence that the West German political and judicial system was 
increasingly comfortable within itself and self-confident enough to propose its own principles as 
a model for Europe. In this sense, the economic and social patterns that defined West Germany 
133 Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European law: The Making of an International Rule of Law in Europe., pg 
98 
134 Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe., pg 172 
135 Tomuschat, "AIIe Guten Dinge Sind lii? Zur Diskussion Um Die Solange-Rechtsprechung Des Bverfg.", pg 351 
136 To circumvent the threat of potential conflict, negotiations took place between the Commission and the West 
German government to ensure that the implementation of European law within the FRG could never potentially 
threaten·the Basic law, thereby calling on the FCC to act. See Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European law: 
The Making of an International Rule of law in Europe., pg 93 
137 Erler and Theime, "Das Grundgesetz Und Die Offentliches Gewalt Internationaler 
Staatengemeinschaften.", p 48, p 110 
138 See footnote 108. See also Memo, 91h October 1974 in BA B106 39568 
Bundesinnenministerium: Vereinbarkeit von EWG-Recht mit dem Grundgesetz. Band 4: Feb 
1973 - Dez 1974. The French Gaullist MEP Coustet raised the idea of infringement proceedings 
against Germany in a written question ( 414/74) on 8th October 1974. 
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in the mid- to late 1970s as 'Model! Deutschland ', the paradigm towards which the rest of 
Western Europe strived, also hold true in a judicial sense. 
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